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From the perspective of the twenty-first century, it is easy to depict the Argentine as a serial 
defaulter and classic example of crony capitalism.  As is well appreciated, by contrast, 
around 1900, the country appeared to be model of >virtuous growth=, founded on sound 
money, an excellent international credit-rating and modern banking.  In short, the country 
that was born to be liberal had become a poster child of contemporary economic liberalism in 
theory and practice, a depiction subsequently endorsed by new political economy and new 
institutional economics writing.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Argentine 
was >liberal= and >advanced=1.     
 
                                                 
1
 Túlio Halperín Donghi >Argentina: liberalism in a country born liberal= in 
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Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor (eds.) A New Economic History of 
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Using the Argentine a case-study, this paper will consider a key element of macroeconomic 
policy - credit, money and banking - through the optic of new contributions to the literatures 
on monetary regimes and crony capitalism.  Much recent work on the architecture of the 
international financial system and global monetary order c.1900 offers new perspectives on 
lender-creditor relations and the operation of world capital markets.  Similarly, drawing on 
the public choice approach associated with the new political economy, some revisionist 
writing on cronyism provides a distinctly nuanced view of state-business engagement.  If the 
late nineteenth century epitomised  the high point of economic liberalism and economic 
internationalism, the Gold Standard was, arguably, the >rule= that most encapsulated ideas 
about market self-regulation, in part setting the macroeconomic framework within which 
government and business interacted.  The dominant monetary regime of the period, the Gold 
Standard governed the market through automatic adjustment and constraining the state.  
Given the centrality of the London, British banks (at home and overseas) are presented as one 
of the principal mechanisms of diffusing an orthodox market-based model of credit provision 
and monetary order.  The global system was unstable, subject to frequent shocks, yet the 
Gold Standard and a competitive financial market ensure sound money and the survival of the 
fittest firms, thereby delivering long-run growth.  To what extent do Argentinian monetary 
and banking arrangements, and the role of London-registered firms operating in the country, 
conform with these stereotypes, and what insights are offered by new writing?  Indeed, how 
close was the match between theory - old and new - and reality?    
 
The paper begins by surveying select recent additions to the literatures on money, credit and 
the business of banking.  It then presents a stylised monetary history of the Argentine, 
followed by an assessment of state-firm relations in the banking sector, largely viewed from 
the perspective of British banks.  In the main, the paper takes as given key recent advances, 
using them to reappraise the history of money, credit and banking in terms of liberalism in 
theory and practice.  The paper does pretend to offer a technical analysis of credit and 
finance, or of the monetary system, nor does it seek to contribute to the on going 
>what-went-wrong= approach to Argentinian history.  Rather, it attempts to explain how and 
why, in some moments, things went right.  Echoing revisionist approaches to policy and the 
politics of policy-making, the paper finds that initial efforts to delivery monetary stability 
were broadly well received by international agents, despite setback, until a profound loss of 
confidence provoked by the Baring Crisis, after which the recovery of >virtue= depended on 
super-orthodoxy (and luck), and constraining cronyism - to a degree.  In the case of the 




Some General Propositions 
 
International capital flows assume state capacity and credibility - as well as liquidity in the 
market.  That is, in the case of sovereign borrowing, a credible commitment by governments 
to service and amortise debt.  Private agents investing abroad require a minimum degree of 
security, a reasonably predictable economic and political order in which to make rational 
long-term decisions.  For individuals and firms, that environment involves calculations about 
the exchange rate risk as well as about rates of return - an expectation that profits yield a 
return on capital and cover possible exchange depreciation when remitting from host to home 
economies, as well as expectations about protection against arbitrary government action.  
Reputation is and was critical.  The ability of states to maintain their own credit shaped the 
general environment, as much as particular policy stances that had a direct impact on the 
macroeconomy.  Was reputation, and predictability, delivered by adhesions to a rule - the 
Gold Standard? Could the markets discipline borrowers and ensure a reasonably stable 
business environment?  Might prestigious merchant banks >police= borrowers, and so ensure 
a market-friendly (orthodox?) policy mix?
2
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 Marc Flandreau and Juan H. Flores >Bondholders vs. bond-sellers?: investment 
banks and conditionality lending in the London market for foreign government 
debt, 1815-1913= European Historical Economics Society Working Paper 2011 
- 0002, pp. 
Two fairly recent discussions in the Gold Standard literature are relevant for this paper: that 
>rules= operated differently in core and peripheral economies, and that there were several 
>routes= to regime credibility.  Thus, although a number of common assumptions prevailed, 
namely that the Gold Standard had become the recognised international monetary order by the 
end of the nineteenth century, and that currencies based on gold implied free convertibility, a 
fixed exchange rates and unregulated movements of metal and/or capital, quite distinct 
arrangements functioned for a large part of the nineteenth century.  Some (mainly core) 
economies conformed closely with the formal rules of the >full= Standard: the currency issue 
was virtually fully collateralised in gold (save for a small, discretionary fiduciary issue), notes 
and gold were freely convertible on demand and there was unrestricted movement of capital.  
Other economies operated a >proportional= cover system, with the monetary authorities 
holding large reserves of gold, though a ratio of gold to paper that was substantially less than 
one hundred per cent of the stock of currency issued.  In yet other cases, usually the 
periphery, it was recognised that economies remained in monetary >transition= for a large part 
of the nineteenth century, moving towards gold from paper or bimetallic regimes, transitions 
that were frequently bumpy and reserves often composed of a mix of bullion, fully-back 
foreign currency notes and government debt - usually British Treasury bills.  Even when 
formally >on= the Gold Standard, in many late-nineteenth-century peripheral economies there 
was little domestic circulation of gold (paper or silver tended to predominate) and reserve 
ratios (usually a mix of bullion and paper) quite low.  In effect, many peripheral countries 
operated what would later be know as the Gold Exchange Standard, rather than the pure Gold 
Standard.  And even if the Gold Standard signalled good house-keeping - financial and fiscal 
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 Barry Eichengreen and Marc Flandreau >Introduction= in Barry Eichengreen 
and Marc Flandreau (eds.) The Gold Standard in Theory and History (London: 
Routledge, Second Edition 2005) pp.3-5; Michael D. Bordo and Finn E. 
Kydland  >The Gold Standard as a Rule= Explorations in 
Economic History XXXII (1995) pp. 423-64; Michael D. Bordo 
and Rockoff >The Gold Standard as a AGood Housekeeping Seal of Approval@= 
Journal of Economic History LVI 2 (1996) pp. 389-428; 
Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor >Sovereign Risk, 
Credibility and the Gold Standard: 1870-1913 versus 
1925-31= The Economic Journal CXIII 487 (2003) pp. 
241-75; Matthias Morys >The Emergence of the Classical 
Gold Standard= CHERRY Discussion Paper 12/01 (2012) 
pp.1-52, see esp. pp14-43. 
Macroeconomic management did not feature in the nineteenth-century lexicon of state craft, 
yet politicians, policy-makers and economic agents were aware of the implications of 
individual policies.  Taxes affected prices and had distributional consequences; customs 
duties, even those intended primarily to raise revenue, changed relative prices and benefited 
some groups at the expense of others.  Samuel Amaral argues persuasively that inflation, as a 
fiscal mechanism, was >discovered during the early national period, and that its functions 
were understood and appreciated by those able to apply it to their advantage
4
.  
Contemporaries may not have theorised about the >trilemma=, but they were aware that 
particular currency regimes had specific implications for credit systems, the exchange rate 
and monetary policy - and for the fiscal state
5
.  The markets understood that the pure Gold 
Standard was rarely feasible in peripheral economies, particularly those lacking deep capital 
markets, well-developed, layered banking and financial institutions, and the means to 
accumulate substantial stocks of the metal, and that a transition from monetary disorder to 
order was difficult.  Hence aspirations to virtue, coupled with a demonstrable and feasible 
commitment to deliver, facilitated a tolerance of delinquency - albeit limited.  Temporary 
suspension of the rules of the game was accepted, provided that there was evidence of a 
credible commitment to re-apply them when conditions permitted.  Market perceptions of a 
determination to be virtuous were enhanced by the presence of a prestigious >patron= or 
>parent bank=, that is, the development of relationship banking between creditors and 
underwriter which gave the former a degree of policy ownership.  Such patrons or parents 
were normally foreign merchant banks, usually London- or Paris-based.  Closely involved in 
floating series of bond issues by particular creditors, the markets assumed that these banks 
could be relied on to encourage peripheral governments to practice good house-keeping in 
order to defend their own reputation as well that of capital-importing/creditor economies
6
.    
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Only recently has state capacity, especially the ability to raise taxes, hardly exercised 
economists.  Unlike historians, who viewed the construction of the fiscal state as a fact to be 
explained, economists took institutional capacity as a given
7
.  Consequently, cronyism - 
usually associated with constraints on the capacity to the state to tax elites and/or the 
conceding of privileges to such groups - was regarded negatively.  It signalled weak 
institutional capacity and was/is bad for growth.  Stressing the negative, Krueger provides a 
useful working definition of crony capitalism, a situation that involves those close to 
government receiving >favours= that have significant economic value.  While these favours 
can entail outright transfers of assets, they tend to involve the provision of economic 
entitlements with considerable capacity to generate rents 
8
.  Qualifying this definition, Haber 
observes that > ... favors allow politically connected economics agents to earn returns above 
those that would prevail in an economy in which the factors of production were priced by the 
market.= 9.  However, along with colleagues, he takes a distinctly less negative stance than 
Krueger, and speculates about potentially positive aspect of cronyism, for example, the extent 
to which a second-best alternative to market competition might facilitate growth and be 
capable of evolving into more dynamic variants.  Crony capitalism may yield a credible, 
protected environment in which private agents have the confidence to invest and do business. 
 A promise of rents and security from asset expropriation by government thus delivers 
opportunities for growth.  Individual can be the beneficiaries of such entitlements, but 
usually the recipients are groups or corporations, organisations that range from the highly 
structured to loose associations.   
 
Company concessions - licences to form and run a business - were common in 
nineteenth-century Latin America, and bore many of the characteristics of cronyism.  
Franchisees were often granted an exclusive privilege, usually for a specified period, and 
exemption from particular taxes.  In addition, some concessions involved asset transfers (for 
example, land and capital grants) and diverse from of subsides (profit guarantees, cheap 
credit, below-cost access to crucial inputs, including labour).  Concessions, then, were the 
norm, conforming with existing legal practice in those countries where modern commercial 
codes were in their infancy and various forms of corporate activity had historically required 
official entitlement to function, and where foreign investors sought the assumed additional 
protection of a government charter. 
 
How useful are these ideas, drawn largely from the development, political economy and new 
institutional economics literatures, which tend to focus on the second globalisation of the late 
twentieth century, for framing an exploration of economic liberalism in late 
nineteenth-century Latin America?  What insights are offered into a study of the credibility 
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 Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson >The Origins of State Capacity: property 
rights, taxation and politics= American Economic Review XCIX 
4 (2009) p.1218.  
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 Anne O. Krueger >Why Crony Capitalism is Bad for Growth= in Stephen Haber 
(ed.) Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: theory and 
evidence (Stanford: Stanford UP 2002) p.2 
9
 Stephen Haber >Introduction: the political econoym of crony capitalism= in 
Stephen Haber (ed.) Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin 
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of macroeconomic >management=, the predictability of the environment within which business 
functioned and the proximity of the policy framework to theoretical depictions, and 
contemporary expectations, about liberal economics.  In short, how did the market function: 
was it open, competitive and (relatively) stable, and free from arbitrary state action as 
assumed in some of the established literature; was there a disjuncture between economic 
liberalism in theory and practice; what did economic liberalism, as practised, deliver? 
 
 
A Stylised History of Credit, Money and Banking 
 
This narrative seeks to provide a description of Argentinian currency regimes, state 
borrowing and banking in order to test some of the arguments about monetary order, state 
credibility, the business environment and cronyism outlined above.  It begins with a short 
account of the monetary system and then explores the development of banking.  Throughout 
there are references to borrowing and the macro economic environment. 
 
The early monetary history of the republic was one of confusion and chaos.  Different 
currencies circulated in various parts of the country.  Complementary (or competitive)  
monetary regimes signalled the weakness of the central administration, and pretensions to 
statehood on the part of some provinces, as much as a general want of coinage and credit to 
serve the needs of production and trade
10
.  Many provinces claimed monetary sovereignty.  
After Independence several regional currency  >zones= emerged in the 
interior as silver coinage of various provenance and different degrees of 
fineness circulated.  Foreign coins circulated widely.  In Buenos Aires 
the paper peso was the principal medium of exchange.  The first >national= 
money appeared in 1822 with the issue of simple bills printed for the >Banco de 
Buenos-Ayres=.  The following year, circulation was standardised with the arrival of silver 
peso coins struck for the province in Birmingham and a definitive series of notes (which were 
much more difficult to forge) printed in London.  Convertibility of the Buenos Aires 
paper peso was, however, >suspended= in 1826, and would not be 
restored until 1866.  Although the paper peso served day-to-day needs in the city and 
province of Buenos Aires, silver was decidedly the metal of the interior, and external 
transactions were conducted in gold - bullion or specie.  Almost everywhere, foreign coins 
had the status of legal tender though were normally only encountered in Buenos Aires.  The 
growth in the volume and variety of paper was notorious.  Paper money bore the stamp of 
several issuing authorities notwithstanding half-hearted attempts to retire old issues and unify 
new series.  On the eve of the 1866 restoration of convertibility, several series of paper were 
still in circulation: namely, notes of the Banco de Buenos Aires (1822-26), the Banco de las 
Provincias Unidas de Río de la Plata (1826-36), the Casa de la Moneda (1836-1853) and the 
Banco y Casa de Moneda (1859-61).  Collectively, these agencies had issued notes valued in 
excess of 400 million paper pesos
11
.  In addition, it is possible that some forced loan 
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 Angel M. Quintero Ramos A History of Money and Banking in Argentina (Río 
Piedras: University of Puerto Rico 1965) pp.24, 29.  
11
 Alberto de Paula & Noemi M. Girbal-Blacha et al History of the Banco de la 
certificates issued by revolutionary governments of the 1810s and 1820s (and accepted as 
currency) may have continued in circulation along with tokens (vales) passed out by 
merchants and estancieros at times of acute monetary scarcity
12
.  Conditions were hardly 
different in the interior, save that the volume of emissions was more modest and the existence 
of institutions even more precarious.  For example, between the mid 1860s and mid 1870s, 
seven banks had been floated and failed in the province of Santa Fé alone
13
.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Provincia de Buenos Aires, 1822-1997 (Buenos Aires: Banco de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires 1998) vol. I, pp.38-41, 45-7; María Alejandra Irigoin 
>Finance, Politics and Economics in Buenos Aires, 1820-1860: the political 
economy of currency stabilisation=, unpublished University of London doctoral 
dissertation, 2000, pp.28&ff.  De Paula and Girbal-Blacha provide a 
descriptive account of currency and banking legislation and detail the 
formation/liquidation of individual >banks=; Irigoin offers an analysis of 
monetary history and policy.  
12
 Angel M. Quintero Ramos A History of Money and Banking in Argentina (Río 
Piedras: University of Puerto Rico 1965) pp.28-41. 
13
 Charles A. Jones, >Personalism, Indebtedness and Venality: the political 
environment of British firms in Santa Fe province, 1865 - 1900= 
Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv IX 2/3 (1983) pp.385-6. 
Attempts in 1860s to stabilise the monetary regime, and effect a return to convertibility, were 
founded on a bimetallic standard that assumed the Spanish-American gold ounce (onza de 
oro) to be equal 16 silver ounces (pesos fuertes), and one silver (hard) peso equal to 25 paper 
pesos.  This gave the gold onza an official value of $400 paper (approximately the price of 
gold then prevailing in the market)
14
.  Efforts to establish a new national currency were aided 
by export growth (particularly sharply rising wool shipments), an influx of foreign investment 
linked to a new wave of railway construction which in turn fostered a further growth of 
production and overseas trade, and the good offices of Barings
15
  Enhanced political stability 
resulting from repurification also contributed to greater confidence.  These conditions were 
not to last.  Monetary order was tested by the outbreak of the war against Paraguay in 1865 - 
the War of the Triple Alliance - and the world crisis of 1866.  Initially, an inflow of Brazilian 
subsidies and war-related boom sustained optimism.  In the long-run, over-issue of notes 
embarrassed the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires and killed convertibility.  The onset 
of another global commercial and financial crisis in 1873 strained the resources of the bank, 
which was further compromised by domestic political instability.  With the prospect of 
renewed conflict between the province of Buenos Aires and the federal government, gold was 
transferred from the Emission Office of the bank to the provincial government and the 
convertibility of Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires notes suspended - the only notes to 
have national legal tender status
16
.  Set up in 1867 as a separate department fo the bank, the 
Emission Office had been charged with accumulating sufficient metallic reserves to manage 
the return to convertibility.  New emissions to finance the Paraguay war, coupled  with 
contracting world trade and declining export prices, ended any possibility of sustaining  
convertibility.  Yet, by 1875, there were further efforts to establish a stable national currency. 
 Again the preference was for convertibility based upon a bimetallic, or limping gold, 
standard.  The bullion market was to be unregulated, and while no limited was placed on the 
minting of gold, silver coinage was not to exceed a value of two pesos per inhabitant.  The 
legal tender status of silver was similarly restricted
17
.  These measures were never put into 
effect and the new peso fuerte remained exclusively a unit of account, yet they evidenced an 
aspiration to be virtuous, certainly on the part of some policy-makers.  
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Generalist >aspiration= and >parent banking= approaches explain >tolerance= of periodic 
delinquency in the 1860s and 1870s.  Irigoin provides an intriguing specific dimension.  Bad 
money may have driven out good, but second-best money was better than none.  Debased 
silver and paper served as growth-inducing mechanisms, monetising and marketising the 
economy, even if implying substantial transactions costs, as contemporary economic agents 
were aware and used to their advantage
18
.  This construct presents traditional accounts of 
>monetary chaos= in a new light.  Was the situation one of monetary chaos or monetary 
complementarity or monetary competition.  The complementarity hypothesis suggests that 
different kinds of money were employed for distinct purposes; the competition hypothesis 
suggests an arrangement favoured by some liberal monetary theorists - currency choice 
enabled some users to select which type of money to use for particular transactions.  
 
For much of this period, the history of currency reform was one of a struggle between 
countervailing demands for easy access to money and for fixed external parities, and between 
contending models of monetary order - bimetallism versus gold monometalism.  Opinions 
differed as to the developmental function of money and banks.  Currency supply and credit 
requirements were inexorably linked.  While external sources of credit were limited, 
government and exporters shared a common interest in loose monetary policies.  Money 
equalled credit: inflation generalised the cost of interest charges and debt repayment.  The 
benefits derived by debtors and producers from easy money and exchange depreciation were 
manifold.  Profit margins widened as producers were paid in gold for exports but defrayed 
domestic costs in paper.  And, at times of increased competition in world markets, a soft 
peso conferred a competitive edge on Argentinian exports.  Various attempts during the 
1860s, 1870s and 1880s to establish the peso successively on a silver standard, a bimetallic 
standard or the gold standard were defeated by a combination of circumstances such as sharp 
deteriorations in the external accounts, pressures upon the budget and seasonal and cyclical 
demand for credit during phases of rapid economic expansion.  Nevertheless, for Panettieri 
the principal stumbling block was the incorrigible preference of the dominant rural oligarchy 
for soft money and easy credit.  This was the key sector in the policy game, and the state 
obliged.  Cronyism flourished.  With investment in land virtually inflation proof, 
landowners had everything to gain from easy credit, facilitated by a system of currency 
inconvertibility, coupled with an unregulated bullion market
19
.  Yet, as foreign borrowing 
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increased during the last decades of the nineteenth century, some politicians and officials 
argued the case for convertibility.  This lead to yet another new currency project in 1881. 
 
The 1881 act broke new ground on several fronts.  It set a more realistic mint ratio between 
gold and silver.  Foreign coins were gradually to lose their legal tender status thereby 
obviating the need for a complicated schedule of official values.  The proposal attempted to 
link the peso to the system arrangement by the Latin Monetary Union (originally formed by 
France, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland, later joined by Spain, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Serbia - and Venezuela) then attracting attention in Latin America, and now presented by 
monetary historians as a step towards gold monometalism
20
.  Notes of the Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires were  to be accepted at the rate of $25 per gold peso.  For a few 
years the system worked.  Export growth and overseas borrowing increased reserves.  Gold 
coins began to enter into circulation.  Old notes were gradually retired and the size of the 
fiduciary issue (mainly fractionary notes) tightly regulated.  However, by the end of 1884 the 
system was beginning to unravel.  The balance of trade deteriorated and the external 
accounts were further pressured by rising interest charges.  Convertibility was suspended in 
1885 and the country embarked upon a debt-led boom that ended in the Baring Crisis.  
Monetary emissions mushroomed, overseas borrowing rocketed and direct foreign investment 
soared.  The general course of events during the 1880s has been well documented and lie 
largely outside the scope of this paper
21
.   The misconduct of official banks, and their role in 
the speculative bubble that preceded the crash and post-Crisis reforms in banking and 
currency legislation are, however, of direct relevance, providing a neat Kruegeresque example 
of cronyism.    
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When the dust settled, the worst expectations of contemporary observers were confirmed.  
Government debt had mushroomed, with service and amortisation payments consuming a 
rising proportion of contracting revenues.  Official banks had lent well beyond authorised 
limits: large, unsecured credits had been channelled to friends of the regime in a splurge of 
crony-lending.  In 1890, debt service consumed around 40 percent of federal government tax 
revenue and represented a similar proportion of export earnings.  The total consolidated debt, 
excluding liabilities such as railway guarantees, was about three and a half time export 
earnings.  In 1890 alone the consolidated debt grew by around 11 percent
22
.  Between 1887, 
when new banking legislation had come into force, and 1889, the money supply increased by 
an average of 40 percent a year, with the monetary base increasing by a further 40 percent in 
1890, largely due to emissions by the guaranteed banks
23
.  The medium-to-long-term 
consequences of the speculative bubble were a massive outward movement of the production 
frontier, but at considerable institution and personal cost in the short-run. 
 
On the eve of the inauguration of his second term, and the return to convertibility, president 
Julio A Roca promised a policy of rigorous economy, involving retrenchment, strict finance 
and a balanced budget.  He would have no truck with protectionism, profligacy and a >low 
exchange=24.  These fine words were backed by hard commitments.  Debt service resumed 
and the gold premium tumbled.  Confidence strengthened further as wool and cereal prices 
rose and export volumes increased.  By the late 1890s, prefiguring Roca=s stance, and 
following agreement with foreign creditors, government expenditure was subject to tighter 
control as more orthodox attitudes to banking, finance and currency prevailed.  Although 
some foreign creditors had mooted the idea of establishing an International Financial 
Commission or Customs Receivership  to supervise Argentinian finances and debt repayment, 
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a mechanism that would have resulted in the surrender of fiscal and monetary sovereignty, in 
the event >discipline= was restored largely at the instigation of domestic actors exemplified by 
Roca.  By that time the Argentine was thoroughly integrated into the world trading and 
financial system.  Having rejected a course of debt repudiation and economic isolation in 
1889 - an option momentarily contemplated by a section of the elite - a final effort was made 
to join the gold club.  At this point, recent experience had demonstrated to the pampean rural 
oligarchy that large supplies of overseas credit and cheap labour were available and that 
sustainable development based upon export-led growth was apparently within reach.  The 
opportunity costs were hardly considered but benefits for the agropecuarian sector were 
tangible.  In narrower terms, the dramatic growth in the volume of exports coupled with price 
improvements both eased the cost of currency reform and threatened to drive up the value of 
the peso.   
 
In 1899 when the Argentine returned to gold, in effect by operating a gold exchange standard, 
the choice was no longer between currency stability and exchange depreciation but between 
stability and currency appreciation.  Agricultural interests knew what course they preferred 
and, in the face of vociferous opposition from groups such as importers who advocated 
continued appreciation, pushed the new conversion law through Congress
25
.  
Policy-ownership remained decidedly local, though restoring market confidence entailed 
substantial long-term domestic political and economic costs
26
.  New writing suggests that had 
an International Financial Commission been set up around 1890, it is likely that credit would 
have been forthcoming earlier and at relatively low rates of interest, a sweetener that would 
have eased the way to fiscal and financial >orthodoxy=27.  If debt repudiation and acceptance of 
foreign financial control lay at the opposite ends of the creditor/borrower crisis spectrum, the 
Argentinian response the Baring Crisis lay somewhere in the middle, entailing the application 
of a programme largely in line with external expectations, but to a timetable (and with 
modifications) principally determined by domestic interests
28
.            
                                                 
25
 J. Panettieri, `La ley de converción de 1899 en el marco de formación de la 
Argentina modern', Desarrollo Económico 21:82 (1981) 231-256; Angel M. 
Quintero Ramos A History of Money and Banking in Argentina (Río Piedras: 
University of Puerto Rico 1965) pp.117-24.  Panettieri goes further, arguing 
that moves to establish the currency on a metallic basis were always designed 
to prevent currency appreciation - in 1899, as in 1881 and the 1860s.  For the 
agrarian sector, a fixed parity was preferable to currency appreciation, though 
the best-option was a soft peso. 
26
 Harry S. Ferns Britain and Argentina (Oxford: Clarendon 1960) pp.471-4; 
Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor (eds.) A New Economic History of 
Argentine (Cambridge: CUP 2003) pp.108-14. 
27
  Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick >The Empire Effect: country risk in the 
first age of globalisation, 1880-1913= Journal of Economic History LXVI 2 
(2006) pp.283-312; Coskun Tuncer >Fiscal Autonomy, Monetary regime and 
Sovereign Risk: foreign borrowing and international financial control in the 
Ottoman Empire, Greece and Egypt during the classic Gold Standard era=, 
unpublished PhD dissertation, LSE, 2011, pp.256-76.  
28
 Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor Straining at the Anchor: the 
Argentine Currency Board and the search for macroeconomic stability, 
                                                                                                                                                          
1880-1935 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001) pp.94-5, 109-117. 
When convertibility was suspended in January, 1885, the gold premium stood at 21.  This 
meant that $121 paper (or formerly convertible >gold= notes) were required to purchase $100 
gold pesos.  Towards the end of the year the premium almost touched 50 before falling back 
as the 1885/6 harvest came in.  Thereafter, there was a modest annual rise in the premium, if 
somewhat obscured by seasonal variations, until the beginning of 1889.  At that point 
substantial monthly hikes were registered.  At the height of the Crisis in October, 1891, the 
monthly average for the gold premium was 336. As the premium rose, the value of 
Argentinian securities fell.  In the eighteen months to June, 1891, the market value of federal 
bonds in London halved; provincial securities declined to a third of their nominal value by 
January, 1890.
29
  Austerity measures and a strengthening of the trade balance for much of 
1892 effected a temporary decline in the premium but further increases were registered in the 
second half of 1893 and early 1894.  Subsequently, the trend was downward.  At the 
beginning of 1898 the premium touched a low of 107 while the average for the year was 127.
30
 
 This was virtually the rate at which convertibility was restored according to a novel formula: 
the par value of $1.00 gold was set at $2.25 paper, giving the $1.00 paper a value of 44 gold 
cents.  In effect this gold/paper parity represented a 56 per cent devaluation of the 1881 paper 
peso which had enjoyed one-to-one parity with the peso oro.  This was the tolerance ceiling of 
monetary virtue, or of the retrenchment and rigorous economy promised by president Roca.  It 
also marked the limit to the >reform= of cronyism - so far, but no further.  Deflation, and tight 
credit, was acceptable, but only up to a point
31
.   
  
For the next half century, the Argentine experienced a period of remarkable monetary stability. 
 Notwithstanding the effect of inflation during the First World War, the general suspension of 
the gold standard by most major trading nations in 1914, and a piecemeal return to gold during 
the 1920s followed by the final breakdown of the system in the early 1930s, the Argentinian 
peso remained relatively firm.  This stability was reflected in foreign exchange markets.  As 
Table I shows, from the 1900s until the 1940s currency supply was tightly 
controlled - possibly excessively so - and the external value of the peso carefully managed.  
Super-orthodoxy was the cost of repeated losses of monetary and fiscal virtue in the late 
nineteenth century, coupled with continuing domestic policy ownership thereafter.  A high 
level of demonstrable commitment was necessary to sustain the confidence of the markets - 
and some local agents.    
 
                  
 Table I: Money Supply and Purchasing Power                               
                                          
       Money Supply      Gold Cover      Purchasing Power 
       (millions of pesos)      (%)        (1900 = 100) 
1900/04          335      * 14.7           100.03        
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1905/09          565          48.1             89.03 
1910/14          773          62.6             82.81 
1915/19        1,069          57.4             59.89 
1920/24        1,354          77.8             52.49 
1925/29        1,334          78.1             60.46 
1930/34        1,246          51.6             71.20 
1935/39        1,314              -                67.97 
1940/44        1,981              -                60.63 
1945/49        6,141              -                36.89 
1950/54       22,086              -               12.82 




         Source: Elaborated from FIAT Concord, Dirección de Planificación y Estudios 
Argentina económica y financiera (Buenos Aires 1966) pp.316-22, tables 258, 
260, 263, 266. 
 
As already argued, the growth in the volume of notes and coins in circulation during the early 
decades of the twentieth century barely kept pace with the huge expansion in economic 
activity.  Massive growth in exports, coupled with positive trade balances and a foreign 
investment boom before 1914 enabled the Exchange Office to accumulate a substantial stock 
of gold.  In compliance with the 1899 conversion law, the fiduciary issue was reduced as gold 
cover rose progressively from the 1900s to the 1920s
32
.  For much of the First World War, the 
peso appreciated against sterling and rose strongly against other European and Latin American 
currencies.  At various points during the 1920s the peso stood above par against the 
currencies of most of the country's major trading partners even, briefly, against the US dollar.  
Reserve cover continued to grow steadily during the latter part of the war and early 1920s 
(years of inconvertibility) and touched a high of 80 per cent in 1923.  When convertibility was 
restored in 1927 the rate of gold cover was 78 per cent and remained at around this figure until 
the peso came off gold.  Bullion reserves only fell sharply in 1931 before gold exports were 
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Both on and off the gold standard, there was relatively little change in currency supply 
between 1916 and 1941, years when many countries were rapidly inflating the volume of notes 
in circulation.  Argentinian money supply moved largely in line with economic activity.  
From a 1914 par value against sterling of $11.4545, the paper peso slipped to $17.21 in 
September, 1931, only to recover thereafter as the pound itself came under pressure.  In 
December, 1939, the free market rate on London was $17.27 against an official selling rate of 
$17.00. The exchange on New York was softer.  In December, 1939, the dollar bought $4.39 
on the free market against an official selling rate of $4.23 and an official 1914 parity of $2.35 
paper pesos.  The story after the late 1940s was very different, with multiple rates of 
exchange, repeated abrupt devaluations and a widening gap between the free market and 
official rates.  The Central Bank maintained an official selling rate of $4.23 on the dollar until 
1948.  In 1949 the average was $4.85.   From 1951 to 1954 the official selling price was held 
at $7.50.  In 1955 the average rate was $10.12 to the dollar.  An official rate of $18.00 was 
defended from 1956 until 1958.  By 1959 the dollar bought $80.63.  Thereafter the rate 
slipped continuously until 1968-69 when a rate of $350.00 was 
34
defended.  However, even 
this degree of instability appears almost negligible when set against the collapse of the 
exchange rate in the late 1980s.  These details hardly convey the scale of confusion in foreign 
exchange markets.  For much of the period from the 1940s to the 1970s a multiplicity of 
official and buying rates applied.  There were frequent adjustments to individual rates while 
the list of transactions that could be conducted at the official rates was itself subject to change. 
 
What construction can be placed on this narrative of Argentinian monetary history?  As Flores 
shows, while the phrased had not been coined when he was writing, Ferns would have denied 
that Barings and Buenos Aires engaged in relationship banking.  Flandreau, too, denies a 
>parental= relationship35.  On the other hand, Ziegler argues that Barings played a large role in 
reassuring the markets
36
.  During the 1860s and 1870s, the House was engaged in floating a 
number of funding and >developmental= loans, and its participation interpreted by the markets 
as conferring a seal of approval.  Barings= internal correspondence also displays an acute 
concern about political and policy issues,  and a willingness to proffer advice.  How could it 
not, given the default on the 1824 loan underwritten by Barings, decades of non-payment and 
protracted negotiations, and the long memory of the market
37
?  This engagement was well 
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known in London, and efforts to re-establish >sound money= were widely reported.  Repeated 
attempts to restore the currency on a metallic basis between 1866 and 1881 may be seen as 
much as a commitment to sound money as failure, possibly explaining why overseas 
borrowing grew as the government floated railway, public works and funding loans in London 
between the late 1860s and mid/late 1880s.  Perhaps the tolerance threshold of delinquency 
increased.  Did good parenting have influence in the 1881 project,  especially the 
commitment to gold?  If parent banking had been a feature of previous decades, the situation 
changed in the 1880s.  International liquidity and the entry on new players considerably 
reduced the influence of the House.  Its >good offices= were no longer necessary to foster 
market appreciation of opportunities in the River Plate and cautionary advice less likely to be 
heeded - if it ever had been.   
 
It may be argued that from the 1860s to the mid 1880s, monetary policy was more orthodox 
than has sometimes been allowed.  There was sufficient evidence of a credible commitment to 
liberal monetary orthodoxy to reassure the markets.  Despite repeated failures to sustain 
convertibility, suspension was accompanied by reasonably convincing evidence of an 
aspiration to conform.  Until the 1880s, that is.  After the 1889-91 crisis, markets were 
considerably more sceptical.  Serial delinquency, coupled with the unfortunate loss of a 
parent/patron, meant that domestic policy ownership could only be sustained by 
super-orthodoxy.   
 
 
Banks, Orthodoxy and Cronyism 
If the condition of the local currency established one set of parameters within which banks, 
including foreign  financial houses operated, official participation in the sector and 
government regulation provided another.  For much of the nineteenth century the most 
important institution in the country was the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires which, as 
the name implies, was the Buenos Aires state bank.  Founded in 1863, it replaced the Banco y 
Casa de Moneda del Estado de Buenos Aires created in 1856.  The Banco y Casa had served 
as the main financial instrument of the province when Buenos Aires sought to establish its 
independence from the Confederation and was by far the most important financial institution 
in the region.  Yet its activities were those of a money-creating agency rather than a bank, a 
function which had also been the principal purpose of its predecessor, the Casa de Moneda, 
liquidated in 1854.   
 
Banks could be brought down by a political crisis - a change of regime, when the >ins= became 
the >outs=.  But what happened in the case of an economic crisis?  Before central banks and 
the development of central banking practices, there was no lender of last resort.  States were 
the protector of last resort.  But which banks to bail out?  Was the decision taken rationally 
and impartially, or discretionally?  Did governments distinguish between those institutions 
suffering a liquidity crisis, temporarily embarrassed by an economic downturn, and those that 
were insolvent, possibly as the result of reckless behaviour that had precipitated the crisis?  
As Charles Jones has argued, in the Argentine in the nineteenth-century, the key question was 
not >What bank?= but >Whose Bank?  By mid-century there was a well-established precedent 
of cronyism and its consequences, namely the liquidation and reconstruction of official 
institutions when they suffered financial embarrassment.  The sequence of bankruptcy, 
liquidation and refinancing hardly served to construct credible commitment - or stability - in 
the >banking sector=, but became the standard response to political and economic crisis.  Banks 
were >allowed to fail= to escape some obligations, but not at the expense of favoured friends of 
a regime.  The interests of some were protected, those of others were not.  Politics, not the 
market, determined which institutions would be protected.   
 
On the other hand, the sequence of foundation, liquidation and re-foundation mirrored that of 
efforts to establish the currency on a metallic basis.  During the 1860s the Banco de la 
Provincia painfully established a reputation as a reasonably solid, dynamic institution.  In 
1882 the bank boasted 24 branches (including head office) in the city and province of Buenos 
Aires, accounted for the lion's share of capital invested banking and held the greater part of 
total deposits.  At that point, the premier British bank, the London and River Plate Bank 
Limited, had four branches, though one was located in Montevideo and another, Córdoba, was 
about to be wound up
38
.  By 1884, the provincial bank accounted for 44.0 per cent of the 
capital of banks operating in Buenos Aires and 68.1 per cent of deposits.  At that point, the 
national bank was held 27.8 per cent of total bank capital and 14.3 per cent of deposits, with  
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Repeated attempts at currency reform (and the exercise of political patronage) resulted in a 
tendency to restrict the right of issue, a privilege that was increasingly reserved for official 
banks.  As Jones notes, before the large-scale overhaul of state banking in the 1890s, the 
conferment or cancellation of the right of issue was less determined by banking theory than the 
political connexions of a particular institution
40
.  The provincial authorities in Buenos Aires 
were notoriously restrictive and jealously attempted to maintain the monopoly rights of the 
Banco de la Provincia, before and after the separation of the province from the Confederation 
in the 1850s.  Nevertheless, across the country, issue rights were almost entirely confined to 
official banks by 1886, when the authorised issue of the national bank accounted for 48 per 
cent of money supply, the Banco de la Provincia 40 per cent, with other provincial banks 
accounting for most of the balance
41
.  All official banks failed during the Baring Crisis, when 
British institutions found their presence in the sector - share of capital and deposits - soar.  
The provincial bank was reconstructed after the Crisis and, having got into further difficulties, 
was reorganised again in 1906 as a mixed entity.  It never attainted the predominance of its 
predecessors.  The dominant position in the sector came to be held by the successor of the 
federal entity set up in 1872 explicitly to challenge the primacy of the Buenos Aires provincial 
bank.  Like the early incarnations of the Buenos Aires provincial bank, the National Bank 
served as an instrument of government policy. 
 
Set up as a mixed entity (the government was to hold 10 per cent of the equity), the Banco 
Nacional initially led a chequered existence and, until the 1890s, was but a pale shadow of its 
provincial counterpart.  Although the original capital was rapidly subscribed, its operations 
were limited by the established position of the Banco de la Provincia in Buenos Aires and by 
the status enjoyed by provincial banknotes from 1874 until 1881.  When convertibility was 
suspended in 1874, only the notes of the provincial bank were granted the status of legal tender 
in the province
42
.  The National Bank suffered a further setback in 1876 when all notes other 
than those of the Banco de la Provincia were excluded from Buenos Aires.  These 
circumstances only changed in 1881 with the federalisation of the city of Buenos Aires and the 
introduction of the gold standard.  Following the suspension of convertibility in 1884, like 
most of the other official and semi-official banks, the Banco Nacional was encouraged to over 
issue.  This tendency was compounded by new banking regulations introduced in 1887.  
 
                                                 
40
 Charles Jones >Personalism, Indebtedness and Venality: the political 
environment of British firms in Santa Fé province, 
1865-1900= Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv IX 3/4 (1983) 
pp.381, 389. 
41
 Angel M. Quintero Ramos A History of Money and Banking in Argentina (Río 
Piedras: University of Puerto Rico 1965) p.83. 
42
 Angel M. Quintero Ramos A History of Money and Banking in Argentina (Río 
Piedras: University of Puerto Rico 1965) pp.54, 55-9. 
The Law of National Guaranteed Banks, or the free banking law, of 1887 is conventionally 
presented as an example of laissez faire ideology
43
.  Founded on the liberal principle of 
>bounded competition= - essentially market-regulated competitive banking underpinned by 
government inspection and guarantee - the act was loosely modelled on US free banking 
legislation.  The >reform= was designed to serve a number of functions, but rapidly 
degenerated into a classic example of crony banking, triggering the question whether the 
collapse of the experiment signalled market or state failure
44
.  Among the principal objectives 
of the act, intended to ensure stability and flexibility, were the repatriation of the overseas 
debt, controlled extension of money supply and the promotion of public confidence by laying 
down stringent reserve requirements and the creation of a banking inspectorate.  Capitalised at 
no less that $250,000, guaranteed banks were required to deposit gold with the Banco 
Nacional: for each $85gold deposited, the bank would receive a $100 gold bond, up to the 
limited of subscribed capital.  The gold bonds were to be left on deposited at the National 
Bank, earning interest at 4.5 per cent.  The note issue of guaranteed banks was limited to 90 
per cent of gold bonds, and they were required to maintain reserves of at least 10 per cent.  
Only banks accepting the provisions of the legislation would be permitted to issue notes.  
Emission limits and reserve requirements were to be policed by the bank inspectorate.  Should 




Most of the acceding banks were national and official, floating loans overseas to accumulate 
gold to deposit at the National Bank, an operation that implied considerable leverage in order 
to increase the monetary base.  Firmly in the pockets of provincial rural oligarchies and a 
federal government anxious to consolidate support, under the guise of fostering agricultural 
development and infrastructure modernisation, the guaranteed banks served as a source of easy 
credit for administrations, public corporations and favoured individuals alike.  Seven of the 
12 banks operating in the country in 1887 acceded. In addition, 13 new guaranteed banks were 
floated under the provisions of the act during the next year or so, over half of which were 
official provincial banks
46
.  During the currency of the act, money supply more than doubled 
from $85 million paper pesos at the end of 1886 to almost $197 million in 1890. 
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Sceptical about the objectives and operation of the 1887 law, British banks declined to seek 
accredition, accepting the loss of issue as a consequence.  Like some other private banks, 
British-registered houses doubted both the competence and the confidentiality of the 
regulatory agency, and questioned its impartiality.   Loss of the right of issue was of little 
significance to the London bank by this stage.  In Buenos Aires, the London bank had learnt 
to live with the note monopoly previously enjoyed by the Banco de la Provincia, a situation 
that was hardly dented when similar privileges were granted to the national bank and other 
provincial agencies registering as guaranteed banks.  In 1882, notes issued by the Córdoba 
branch of the London bank had been called in when the branch was liquidated.  Issue rights of 
the Rosario branch had been cancelled unilaterally by the Santa Fé provincial government in 





The nature of their business determined that regulation, rather than competition with state 
institutions, was most likely to exercise British and other overseas banks, hence the heightened 
concern about the impartiality of regulatory agencies.  Local banks - semi-official and official 
- tended to offer accommodation to government (national and provincial) and a narrow circle 
of politicians and powerful landowners.  Perforce, foreign banks often had to offer 
accommodation to political figures but preferred not to.  Instead, British banks wished to 
concentrate on short-term commercial business and managing the accounts of British residents 
and companies.  However, potential for conflict with local firms should not be underestimated 
during early years of operations in the River Plate.  Again, as Jones has shown, local bankers 
were infuriated by the unwillingness of the principal British banks to come to their assistance 
at moments of difficulty and were thoroughly displeased by the ability of some London 
registered institutions to survive when domestic firms were forced to close their doors.  Even 
more disappointing were the conservative practices of British institutions, considered ill-tuned 
to the requirements of an expanding capital- and credit-hungry economy.  Tensions were often 
greatest when closer supervision was imposed from London on Latin American branches, 
curbing looser lending practices applied by managers who had grown accustomed to the local 
way of doing business
48
.   
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 Foreign banks were also exercise by the threat of discriminatory taxation, action they depicted 
as illiberal and decidedly likely to damage business.  As part of a package of measures 
devised to restore public finances at the onset of the Baring Crisis, bank profits were subject to 
a tax of 7 per cent but an additional levy of 2 per cent was to be charged on deposits placed in 
foreign banks.  Although presented as an emergency fiscal measure, discriminatory legislation 
was intended to strengthen the position of official banks at the expense of foreign.  The 
refusal of the (mainly) foreign banks to accept the provisions of the guaranteed banks act had 
been widely resented in government circles and by 1890 was held to have damaged confidence 
in the new system.  Only with the imminent collapse of the National and Provincial banks was 
the threat countered in 1890/91.  Pressed by the government to participate in a loan to save the 
two premier official banks, the price extracted by the London bank was that discriminatory 
taxation on deposits should be abandoned
49
. 
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Unsurprisingly, until 1899, another problem confronting banks - particularly foreign houses - 
arose from the currency situation.  Foreign banks were always anxious about the position of 
gold accounts.  Conducting business in both gold and paper, they paid special attention to 
movements of gold into and out of the country.  Despite aspirations to virtue, the problems 
encountered in attempting to establish the currency on a metallic basis advised considerable 
caution both during periods of convertibility and inconvertibility.  While gold always 
circulated freely in the city of Buenos Aires, not least when the paper peso was inconvertible, 
during periods of convertibility private banks were vigilant least they be embarrassed by the 
declaration of a curso forzoso, a sudden suspension of convertibility of the notes of official 
and semi-official banks, or a decree authorising the settlement of gold obligations in paper.  
Consequently, foreign banks were frequently subject to the charge of conspiring against the 
currency.  Managers of foreign banks might argue that an unwillingness to hold very large 
amounts of >gold notes= was simple prudence, an action justified by the monetary history of  
the Republic.  Local banks of issue and their supporters, on the other hand, almost invariably 
viewed the regular presentation of notes for conversion into gold by a foreign competitor as a 
crude strategy to undermine their position.  Local politicians also interpreted such action as at 
best unfriendly or a conscious ploy to frustrate imaginative monetary reform.  Antagonism 
was inevitable when actions regarded by foreign banks as an issue of business management 
were viewed by officials and politicians as an attack on policy
50
.   
 
Much as bankers would have wished it otherwise, the currency situation was a hazard 
endowed with political as well as business implications. And - as all parties were aware - good 
profits could be made from exchange speculation.  Experience dictated that a balance had to 
be kept between gold and paper obligations and exposure reduced when difficulties were 
anticipated.  For example, during 1875 the Bank of London reduced by 60 per cent the value 
of its notes in circulation.
51
  In part this was due to the dispute in Santa Fé which resulted in 
the cancellation of issue rights of the Rosario branch, but was also due to concern that the 
anticipated suspension of convertibility of notes of the Banco de la Provincia might produce a 
run on all banks.  (The decree suspending the convertibility of provincial notes came early in 
1876).  
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Again, the Baring Crisis was pivotal, influencing banking practice as monetary policy.  If 
policy-makers ultimately viewed super-orthodoxy as the price of monometalism in 1899, 
banking practice was reshaped in the fallout from the crisis.  Contemporaries viewed 
guaranteed banks, responsible for incontinent note issue, as the principal cause of the crisis.  
Illegal emissions and the failure of supervision were a function of crony banking.  The 
National and Provincial banks were prime examples of cronyism, and the first to experience a 
run.  Of twenty banks organised to conform with the provisions of the 1887 free-banking 
legislation, all but two failed in the Crisis.  The outcome was a return to forms of conservative 
banking long advocated by British houses
52
.  After the crash, the Banco Nacional was 
reorganised in 1891 as the Banco de la Nación Argentina.  As earlier, the stated intention was 
to float the bank as a mixed corporation in order to prevent political control, but the public was 
wary - as well as weary - of an official entity, suspecting a resurgence of cronyism
53
.  The 
bank conducted a modest business until 1904 when its charter was modified, becoming an 
exclusively state institution. As the principal official bank, demonstrably adhering to the rules 
of the game,  it gradually grew in prestige from the turn of the century.  Before 1914 it was 
already the dominant institution in the local market and gained in importance thereafter.  On 
the eve of the First World War the Banco de la Nación held almost half the reserves of the 
whole banking system.
54
  From this position it began to perform quasi-central banking 
functions during the 1920s. 
 
Most bankers thoroughly approved the managed appreciation of the peso until 1899 when the 
Gold Exchange Office (Caja de Converción) reopened its doors.  The Caja held the greater 
part of the country=s gold reserves, shown in Table I, and retained responsibility for the issue 
of currency until the 1930s.  If there were complaints, they were over details of practice not 
policy.  By 1914 and during the 1920s bankers bemoaned the excessive caution of the Banco 
de la Nación, its failure to offer re-discounting facilities in the face of rigid monetary control 
(aggravated by the retention of Argentinian paper pesos in neighbouring republics, especially 
Paraguay, where Argentinian notes were held as a reserve currency)
55
.  There were grumbles 
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too at the tardy establishment of a Clearing House and the refusal of the Banco de la Nación to 
participate.  From 1892 until 1912, when the agency was finally transferred to the national 
bank, the Clearing House operated from the premises of the London bank.  Nevertheless, 
bankers in general, and foreign bankers in particular, welcomed continuing commitment to the 
monetary rule of the day, and probably recognised that super-orthodoxy was the price of 
guarantee bank delinquency.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Argentine (Cambridge: CUP 2003) pp.127-8, 169-77. 
Preliminary Findings 
 
This paper has revisited money and banking in the Argentine around 1900 to test whether or 
not policy was liberal in intent and/or outcome, arguing that the monetary regime of the day, 
the Gold Standard, was one of the key components of the prevailing order.  The Gold 
Standard rule was predicated on assumptions of a market-based self-regulating mechanism.  
In much of the traditional literature on the history of money and banking in the Argentine, 
British banks are depicted as the principal exponents of orthodox (non-developmental) 
banking practices that conformed closely with the maintenance of the monometallic currency 
regime. 
 
Conventionally, the (unsuccessful) struggle >permanently= to establish the currency on a 
metallic basis for much of the second half of the nineteenth was presented as a failure (or 
unwillingness) to abide by the rules of the game.  Viewed through the optic of new lines of 
thinking, this paper questions that assessment.  The sequence of moments when the currency 
was convertible - backed by silver or gold or both - and reasonably convincing efforts to return 
to metal when the moment was opportune, may be depicted in a different light.  With the 
support of a >parent= lending some credence to these efforts, and aware of the exogenous nature 
of most crises, as well as a sense of movements in the external accounts, domestic and 
international markets tolerated temporary >delinquency=, recognising periodic declarations of a 
curso forzoso as an inevitable (and appropriate) policy response at moments of stress.  Or, 
rather, that internal and domestic markets did so until the Baring Crisis.  The debacle of 1890 
produced an attitudinal change in the markets.  Thereafter, and in part a function of a strong 
emphasis on domestic policy ownership, confidence and credibility was only established (and 
sustained) by an exceptionally conservative approach to currency and credit management, an 
approach that also necessitated demonstrable efforts to curb cronyism in the banking sector.  
In other circumstances, cronyism might have been a useful developmental tool, but the 
experience of free-banking in the run-up to the crisis generated public and market intolerance 
of practices that diverged too far from the exceedingly cautious or conservative. 
 
The revisionist literature shows that cronyism may function as a second best alternative to 
market capitalism, as conventionally presented, when privileged access to politics secures the 
property rights of insiders, favours generate rents and rents are productively applied.  Crony 
banks neatly typifies these characteristics.  They enjoy special favours, which may include 
monopoly rights such as that to print currency, and official support in moments of distress.  
They serve as money/credit machines for those with potentially profitable ventures in which to 
invest.  In short, the arrangement generates funds, opportunities and reduces risk, and is 
conducive to growth.  Crony banking in the Argentine before and during the 1880s manifest a 
number of these features.  For example, monopoly rights of issue secured by various 
incarnations of the Buenos Aires provincial bank, protection from the costs of failure enjoyed 
by successive officials banks (or favoured insiders), differential (or discretionary) application 
of the rules of the game, and freedom to manufacture money.  Did the system facilitate growth 
(ultimately productive capacity expansion and resources generation), or an ephemeral bubble?  
As stated above, there was an outward movement of the frontier of production, which included 
some over-build or generation of ( temporary) excess capacity, features of investment booms 
and the business cycle in general.  The bubble of the late 1880s displayed some of traits; it 
also manifest distinctly negative features.  Acute macroeconomic volatility, represented by 
rapid monetary expansion, fiscal incapacity, accelerating inflation and exchange depreciation 
detailed above, weakened property rights and incentives.  Temporary asset valorisation and 
credit diversion, as occurred in the latter part of the 1880s, did not signal productive capacity 
expansion.  In addition, the opportunity cost was high, as illustrated by the task of restoring 
credibility to the banking sector - the locomotive of growth (?) - following the collapse of 
crony guaranteed banks.  Free-banking in the Argentine barely conformed with the theory of 
economic liberalism, the practice was even more distant.  Rapacious insider banking, yes; 
efficient, self-regulating, disciplined by the market and conforming to liberal/orthodox 
precepts, or delivering second-best growth, hardly - or not until long after the Crisis.   
 
 
 
 
 
